Memo to Merkel: Post-election Germany and Europe.  Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/05, 24 September 2013 by Schwarzer, Daniela & Wolff, Guntram B.
MEMO TO MERKEL:
POST-ELECTION
GERMANY AND EUROPE
bruegelpolicybrief
ISSUE2013/05
SEPTEMBER 2013
by Daniela Schwarzer
Head of Division EU Integration,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
daniela.schwarzer@swp-berlin.org
and Guntram B. Wolff
Director of Bruegel
guntram.wolff@bruegel.org
POLICY CHALLENGE
The new German government should work on three priorities: (1) Domestic
economic policy should be more supportive of growth and adjustment, with
higher public investment, a greater role for high-value added services, and
more supportive immigration policy. (2) Germany should support a mean-
ingful banking union with a centralised resolution mechanism requiring a
transfer of sovereignty to Europe for all countries including Germany. (3)
The establishment of a private investment initiative combined with a Euro-
pean Youth Education Fund and labour market reforms should be promoted.
Building on these prior-
ities, a significant
deepening of the euro
area is needed, with a
genuine transfer of
sovereignty, stronger
institutions and demo-
cratically legitimate
decision-making struc-
tures in areas of
common policy.
Economic policy priorities for German business
THE ISSUERecent economic data points to the seeds of an economic recov-
ery in the European Union. However, significant risks remain and bold
policies are still needed. There are three central risks. First, competitive-
ness adjustment is incomplete, casting doubt on the sustainability of
public debt. Second, banking remains unstable and fragmented along
national lines, resulting in unfavorable financial conditions, which further
erode growth, job creation and competitiveness. Third, rising unemploy-
ment, especially among the young, is inequitable, unjust and politically
risky. Germany has a central role to play in addressing these risks.
Source: Bruegel-SWP German business survey. See Figure 2.
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1. DAX 30 companies
plus 10 banks. The
return rate was 60 per-
cent (24 of the 40
answered). We included
several additional ques-
tions in addition to
those reported here.
Not all 24 returns
answered all questions.
THE EURO AREA: INCOMPLETE
ACHIEVEMENTS
Recent economic recovery in the
euro area feeds the belief that the
sovereign debt and banking crises
are finally over. The combined
efforts of the European Central
Bank and euro-area member
states have resulted in major sta-
bilisation and less financial stress.
But the situation remains unsatis-
factory. Financial fragmentation
makes it impossible for small and
medium-sized companies in
some, mostly southern, euro-area
regions to access affordable
credit. Meanwhile, relative price
adjustment is insufficient. If prices
fall and the economies of crisis
countries stall or even shrink, the
sustainability of their public debt
will be brought into question again.
A further round of crisis might set
in and could make new and larger
programmes or sovereign default
possible (Box 1).
Though there are still major risks,
the euro area has made progress.
Since the beginning of the crisis,
euro-area member state govern-
ments have combined acute crisis
management, for instance
installing the rescue mechanisms,
the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM), with moves towards a rein-
forced euro-area governance
framework, with the aim of pre-
venting future financial, banking
and sovereign debt crises.
For political and legal reasons,
governments' response to the cri-
sis has increasingly relied on
intergovernmental elements. The
most effective remedy, however,
has been provided by a federal
institution, the ECB. It was the
ECB’s announcement of the OMT
programme that successfully
calmed the crisis in autumn 2012.
The flip-side of the slump in mar-
ket pressure has been a slowing
of the crisis-led governance
reform progress. Policymakers
must now show strong leadership
to move the euro area into the
next phase of integration. The
unsatisfactory financial, fiscal
and socio-economic situation
calls for further euro-area reform.
Germany, willingly or not, will be
central to the building of the
future euro area. Its economic
size, its role as the largest lender
and its safe-haven status have
increased German influence.
Decisions that it makes or
chooses not to make have conse-
quences for the European Union
and the euro area in particular.
The German government (and
parliament) has the power of veto
over the design of rescue pack-
ages. Germany has also
leveraged its domestic legal and
political constraints to increase
BOX 1: RISKS FOR THE STABILITY OF THE EURO AREA
The  banking sector remains weak with market-to-book values well
below 100 percent, suggesting that markets are still nervous about the
quality of banks’ books. The forthcoming ECB asset quality review
could be a crystallising moment for Europe’s banking system. If govern-
ments are unprepared, a prolongation of the banking crisis, with
subdued credit and investment, is possible.
Second, unemployment is extremely high and poverty is on the rise
with dire consequences in a number of member states. Social protests,
growing populism and the presence of extremist parties in parliaments
can prevent reform or oust governments, leading to debt crisis. This is
all the more a risk while the credibility of the crisis management set-up
remains fragile. The way Cyprus was handled showed vividly how eas-
ily a mistake with major consequences can be made when
decision-making processes remain fragmented and slow. Visible ten-
sions in the Troika of the International Monetary Fund, European
Commission and ECB, and inconclusive debates about debt restructur-
ing, could add to market nervousness.
Third, the vulnerability of the euro area would radically increase if
doubts about the ECB’s OMT (Open Monetary Transactions) bond-buy-
ing programme fester. The German Constitutional Court is likely to rule
on the compatibility of OMT with the German Constitution in October
2013. Capital outflows driven by negative expectations are likely to set
in, bringing back the sovereign-debt crisis even without a deterioration
of economic fundamentals, if the verdict is negative.
The assessment that the euro area remains vulnerable is shared by a
number of German business leaders. Bruegel and SWP surveyed 24
chief financial officers and chief economists from major German com-
panies and banks
1. Nine stated that the situation in 2013 is better than
in 2012, while 11 thought that the situation is the same or worse
(seven said the same; four said worse). The deterioration of the debt
crisis, social unrest and banking instability are the areas of greatest
concern for most respondents.MEMO TO MERKEL: POST-ELECTION GERMANY AND EUROPE
b
r
u
e
g
e
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
b
r
i
e
f 03
2. Zsolt Darvas (2013),
‘The euro area’s
tightrope walk: debt and
competitiveness in Italy
and Spain’, Policy Con-
tribution2013/11,
Bruegel.
its bargaining power in the negoti-
ations on governance reforms.
The new German government will
face a double challenge when
devising its strategy on the future
development of the euro area.
First, it will have to strategically
balance its short-term national
policy preferences with its neces-
sary contribution to the further
stabilisation of the euro area,
which is in Germany’s long-term
interest. German domestic eco-
nomic policies will need to
contribute to rebalancing the euro
area. Second, the further develop-
ment of the euro-area governance
and crisis management struc-
tures, especially in relation to
banking and fiscal union, is in Ger-
many’s long-term interest
because it will stabilise the EU,
but it might entail short-term
costs. However, if the euro area
heads towards further deepening,
which might require a change to
the EU Treaty, the German govern-
ment will have to fully engage in
finding a compromise for the
future architecture of the euro
area that is acceptable to all
member states. Given the growing
tensions between governments,
domestic social and political ten-
sions in the crisis countries, and
the rise of euro-sceptic groups in
some member states, agreement
on a new Treaty and subsequent
ratification will require the Ger-
man government to be prepared
for true compromise.
The following three proposals
would greatly reduce financial
and political instability in the
short and medium terms, and
would make future reform of the
euro area's governance struc-
tures easier.
REBALANCING THE EURO AREA:
THE ROLE OF GERMAN NATIONAL
ECONOMIC POLICY
One of the most important factors
for competitiveness rebalancing
and debt sustainability is the con-
sistency of German economic
policy with the needs of the euro
area as a whole. The German
economy makes up 28 percent of
the euro-area economy, and Ger-
man economic policy decisions
therefore automatically have
implications for the euro area.
Prices and wages in the euro area
dramatically diverged in the first
ten years of Economic and Mone-
tary Union, with prices in the
south increasing more than aver-
age, while prices in Germany fell
below the average. There has
been some adjustment during the
crisis, especially since autumn
2011. Core inflation rates in the
south of Europe in the meantime
have fallen to close to zero per-
cent. Price dynamics in some
southern countries have since
undercut the euro-area average,
which is a result of the deep
recessions in those countries.
Meanwhile, German inflation
rates, despite a strong economy
and low unemployment, have
remained below average for most
of the period and have only
recently moved above the aver-
age. They have even been below
the two percent inflation ceiling
pursued by the ECB. Such low
inflation rates in the euro area’s
largest economy make the rela-
tive price adjustment more
difficult, because they eventually
push the south towards deflation.
The latest inflation data (Figure 1)
shows that euro-area core infla-
tion has been falling constantly
since early 2012 and is now at
close to 1 percent annually. Core
inflation rates in the south of
Europe in the meantime have
fallen to close to zero. If prices fall
and the economy stalls or even
shrinks, debt sustainability
becomes more elusive
2. Bigger
support programmes for current
and future crisis countries, or sov-
ereign defaults, become
significantly more likely in this
macro-economic setting.
Three policies would help allevi-
ate the rebalancing problem in
the south.
The first is more domestic invest-
ment. Germany has recently
-0.5%
0%
0.5%
1%
1.5%
2%
2.5%
J
a
n
 
2
0
0
9
M
a
r
 
2
0
0
9
M
a
y
 
2
0
0
9
J
u
l
 
2
0
0
9
S
e
p
 
2
0
0
9
N
o
v
 
2
0
0
9
J
a
n
 
2
0
1
0
J
u
l
 
2
0
1
3
Euro area (changing composition)
Germany
Unweighted average (GRE, IRL, ITA, POR, SPA)
M
a
r
 
2
0
1
0
M
a
y
 
2
0
1
0
J
u
l
 
2
0
1
0
S
e
p
 
2
0
1
0
N
o
v
 
2
0
1
0
J
a
n
 
2
0
1
1
M
a
r
 
2
0
1
1
M
a
y
 
2
0
1
1
J
u
l
 
2
0
1
1
S
e
p
 
2
0
1
1
N
o
v
 
2
0
1
1
J
a
n
 
2
0
1
2
M
a
r
 
2
0
1
2
M
a
y
 
2
0
1
2
J
u
l
 
2
0
1
2
S
e
p
 
2
0
1
2
N
o
v
 
2
0
1
2
J
a
n
 
2
0
1
3
M
a
r
 
2
0
1
3
M
a
y
 
2
0
1
3
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, July 2013. Note: Core inflation is an inflation
measure excluding volatile food and energy prices.
Figure 1: Figure: Evolution of core inflation (Jan 2009 – July 2013)b
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invested significantly abroad, but
success has been limited. Most of
Germany’s net savings, ie current-
account surplus, between
2006-11 was needed to cover
losses on previous financial
investments, according to Euro-
stat data. In other words,
Germany’s net external wealth
hardly increased. Greater external
stability would change this situa-
tion for the better for Germany,
but arguably the most stable and
least risky investments could be
made in Germany itself. 
A shift towards more investment
could be triggered by an increase
in public investment. Arguably,
German public infrastructure is
sub-optimal as a result of one of
the lowest public investment
rates in the EU. Investment in
education has also been rela-
tively subdued at 5 percent of
GDP in 2012 (compared to 6.2
percent on average for OECD
countries). The share of invest-
ment in education as a share of
public spending is likewise low
(10.5 percent compared to the
OECD average of 13 percent) and
more investment in education
and research would also be part
of an increase in public invest-
ment. Increasing the public
(tangible and non-tangible) capi-
tal stock would raise private
capital productivity, leading to
more private investment, which
would be followed by more labour
demand. Given that Germany is
close to full employment, this is
likely to trigger two things:
increased demand for workers
from abroad and for higher wages.
German industry would be forced
even further up the global value
chain. Higher wages, also boosted
by better education and greater
knowledge capital levels arising
from more public research invest-
ment, could lead to a
restructuring towards the high
value added services sector. Pri-
vate investment and increased
economic activity could be fur-
ther promoted by more generous
tax incentives for investment.
Such a shift would help the rebal-
ancing by opening up greater
opportunities for lower value-
added industry in southern
Europe. Higher growth would
increase demand for imports from
southern Europe, while the
increase in the relative price level
would make southern European
products more competitive. 
Second, conditions for immigra-
tion into Germany should be
improved further as part of a
wider initiative to improve EU
labour mobility. It is a positive sig-
nal that more people (369,000)
came to Germany than left in
2012. More public and private
investment could further increase
the boom in the labour market, so
corporations will increasingly
have to look for foreign spe-
cialised workers. Such an
increase in immigration would be
an additional adjustment chan-
nel: instead of a change in the
German production structure,
immigration would allow current
structures to remain but would
reduce unemployment in
affected countries. But immi-
grants do not necessarily have
the skills needed. Specialised
vocational training, language
courses and more integration and
language-support measures in
German schools would be a use-
ful investment for Germany and
would facilitate labour migration
from countries with high unem-
ployment rates. However, even a
stark increase in net immigration
to Germany would not solve the
unemployment problems of
southern Europe in a meaning-
fully short period, though they
would help alleviate the pressure.
Third, the necessary rebalancing
in the euro area would be crucially
facilitated by a growing services
sector in Germany. The new Ger-
man government should very
carefully review the sectors that
are most regulated. Based on this,
further liberalisation measures
should be taken to allow them to
grow
3. While liberalisation might
in the short term have a deflation-
ary effect, the eventual increase
in economic activity should over-
take that effect. A liberalised
services sector would also make
German manufacturing more effi-
cient and would represent a
source of new jobs, including for
immigrants. Of course, this would
also shift the structure of German
industry towards more services.
At the same time, German growth
would increase. Such a shift
would also be associated with ris-
ing wages in Germany, which
would further boost demand for
foreign products.
Ultimately, the central factor will
be that Germany does not resist a
market-driven rebalancing of the
economy. With the ECB aiming to
keep inflation close to but below 2
percent, German inflation will
have to move above the 2 percent
threshold. It should be clearly
communicated that this is not at
all a softening of the ECB’s man-
date. On the contrary, the ECB
would aim to keep euro-area infla-
tion rates at 2 percent. The higher
rate in Germany would merely be
3. One sector that may
potentially lend itself to
such a reform is the
health sector.b
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4. See Zsolt Darvas,
Jean Pisani-Ferry and
Guntram Wolff (2013),
‘Europe’s growth
problem (and what to
do about it)’, Policy
Brief2013/03, Bruegel.
5. André Sapir and Gun-
tram Wolff (2013), ‘The
neglected side of bank-
ing union: reshaping
Europe’s financial sys-
tem’, Policy
Contribution1013/13,
Bruegel
MEMO TO MERKEL: POST-ELECTION GERMANY AND EUROPE
limits of this approach have
become obvious and the risk that
political forces that argue for an
end of reforms and austerity –
inside or outside the euro area –
become stronger is apparent. The
approach should therefore be
complemented by supportive
policies in the surplus countries,
as suggested here. The less-effi-
cient and politically unacceptable
alternative would be to install an
explicit transfer system.
COMPLETING THE BANKING UNION
Completion of banking union
should be the second priority for
German policymakers. Solving
the banking problems and ending
the fragmentation of financial
markets is the central element of
a crisis-resolution strategy and a
growth strategy
4. Since the deci-
sion of the European Council of
June 2012 to break the vicious
circle between banks and govern-
ments, significant progress has
been made. The Council and the
European Parliament have agreed
on the creation of a single super-
visory mechanism in the ECB,
which will be tasked with the
direct supervision of all large
banks in the euro area and in EU
countries outside the euro area
that wish to join the mechanism.
The ECB will also have overall
supervisory responsibility for the
entire banking system including
the small banks.
But the creation of a single super-
visor can only be the first step
towards a completed banking
union, which needs to be followed
by a single resolution mechanism
and an agreement on how to
share the burden between private
creditors, national taxpayers and
a common fund. The political
debate on those issues will be the
central debate at the European
level in the autumn of 2013. It is
of central importance that Europe
concludes those discussions in
time for the ECB’s asset quality
review of the banks’ balance
sheets. A European resolution
framework is needed for a num-
ber of reasons
5. First, it is a way of
protecting the ECB from pressure
to delay triggering resolution and
to keep insolvent banks with liq-
uidity and Emergency Liquidity
Assistance (ELA) afloat. Second, a
European resolution authority is
essential to ensure that bank fail-
ures do not result in major
disruption of the European bank-
ing system. Third, if a resolution is
needed, a European rather than a
national solution is desirable to
keep the financial market inte-
grated. In particular, if a
cross-border rather than purely
national merger would make
sense from a business perspec-
tive, it should not be prevented by
the fragmentation of resolution
authorities along national lines.
Three principles are central to bur-
den sharing in the banking union.
The first is to minimise the burden
on taxpayers by involving private
a reflection of lower rates else-
where. This increase in German
inflation and wages will, however,
have distributional conse-
quences for German society, even
though the country as a whole
would benefit. Eventually, it will
mean that the German economy
will become much more than now
an engine of euro-area growth.
These policy recommendations
are broadly endorsed by German
business as surveyed by Bruegel
and SWP. While a significant num-
ber of respondents are content
with current economic policy,
those representatives of German
corporations polled who see a
need for change emphasise the
importance of increased public
investment, deregulated services
and, most importantly, improved
immigration conditions (Figure 2).
Rebalancing competitiveness in
the euro area is necessary to
ensure the sustainability of pub-
lic finances in the crisis countries.
The current strategy to put most
of the adaptation pressure onto
the countries running an external
deficit has resulted in significant
progress on reforms and wage
flexibility in the south. However,
the economic, political and social
0123456789 10
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Source: Bruegel-SWP German business survey. Note: no. respondents highlighting each priority.
Figure 2: Priorities for German economic policycreditors to the greatest extent
possible without undermining
financial stability. The second is
that fiscal responsibility should in
principle reside with those, who
have (had) supervisory and
broader economic policy respon-
sibility. The third is that common
fiscal support is desirable and
also in Germany’s interest if it can
avoid forbearance or fiscal insta-
bility in affected countries and
further fragmentation of the Euro-
pean financial market.
The precise institutional set-up of
the European resolution mecha-
nism is beyond the scope of this
Policy Brief. As a guiding principle,
it will be important that the mech-
anism can come to a decision on a
bank in resolution in a relatively
short period and that national
considerations do not play a sig-
nificant role in the resolution
process. The creation of a com-
mon resolution fund appears
indispensable for this, as does a
decision-making mechanism that
is not based on unanimity. This
ultimately means a transfer of
sovereignty because all member
states could be overruled by the
European level in a resolution
process. 
A PROMISE OF GROWTH AND JOBS,
IN PARTICULAR FOR THE YOUNG
UNEMPLOYED
National governments are prima-
rily responsible for labour market
policies and for addressing unem-
ployment and youth unemploy-
ment. Germany should continue
to demand – as it is doing – major
reforms that will improve labour
market conditions and increase
the opportunities for businesses
to grow and to become more com-
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petitive. However, in a monetary
union, there are not only multiple
spillovers in the labour market but
also limits to the power of national
governments. Low economic
growth resulting from a difficult
adjustment process is one of the
principle reasons for high unem-
ployment. Private investment in
southern Europe is extremely
depressed by the weakness of
bank and corporate balance
sheets. Moreover, we have argued
that insufficient growth in Ger-
many further adds to the problem.
There is thus an economic argu-
ment for the EU to be involved in
solving the growth and unemploy-
ment problems.
There is also a strong political
argument in favour of a credible
initiative to tackle unemployment
now. It would send a significant
European signal of hope and
recognition that the sharing of a
single currency requires support
for those most affected by the cri-
sis. Such an initiative coming out
of Germany would be a particu-
larly strong signal for Europe’s
south, and would help curtail
euro-scepticism which, in turn,
will be one of the main obstacles
to any further integration steps
that are desirable. Citizens clearly
need a message of hope. A bank-
ing union alone will not convince
them of Europe.
The new German government
should therefore accelerate sup-
port for private investment in
southern Europe. In the short
term, this should mean quick
progress on lending to SMEs. A
further initiative could be to pro-
vide tax incentives to German
corporations that invest in the
region. Increasing private invest-
ment in the region by ending
financial fragmentation would
clearly be of central importance to
end the recession. 
Additionally, a European Youth
Education Fund should be estab-
lished to back up the
recently-decided measures on
youth unemployment, which are
clearly insufficient. Since the EU
level has few levers to directly
and effectively promote employ-
ment, a shift in emphasis towards
education is warranted. The pro-
gramme could finance education
initiatives for young unemployed
people throughout the euro area.
Incentives would be given to firms
for hiring and training young
unemployed people. The pro-
gramme would also provide
funding for language training and
stays abroad. It would thus
improve the cross-border mobility
of the young labour force and con-
tribute to the building of a
European identity, which is all the
more important because it is
being undermined by the eco-
nomic, social and political effects
of the crisis.
The initiative to re-establish sig-
nificant private investment and to
combat youth unemployment
should be of sufficient size. The
AAA countries and France should
agree to increase European
Investment Bank capital by €30
billion and accept that EIB activi-
ties would become heavily
concentrated on the most
affected countries instead of, as
currently, being spread across
the entire EU. They should also
agree on a youth unemployment
fund of €20 billion to fund train-
ing, mobility and work incentives.
The support should be made con-ditional on the implementation of
national labour-market reforms.
GOVERNANCE REFORMS AND
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
By accepting the completion of
banking union, the new German
government would crucially con-
tribute to stabilising the euro area
and preventing a further deterio-
ration of the crisis emanating
from the banking sector. A reorien-
tation of German economic policy
would help rebalance the cur-
rency union and alleviate the
profound economic, social and
political crisis in some countries.
Beyond its expected beneficial
economic effect, a private invest-
ment initiative with an additional
European Youth Education Fund
would be a clear signal ahead of
the European elections that the
unemployment population is not
forgotten amid the concerns
about calming financial markets.
The combination of these three
measures, which could be imple-
mented at short notice, would
prepare the political ground for
further far-reaching reform of the
euro area. Progress needs to be
made in three areas: fiscal union
including a euro-area budget, the
establishment of stronger supra-
national governance structures,
and the democratisation of deci-
sion-making for when joint
decision-making is necessary at
EU level. While none of these
areas can be fully covered here,
we discuss the objectives of fur-
ther integration in each area.
Fiscal union has de facto been
launched by establishing fiscal
control and sanctioning mecha-
nisms to avoid negative spill-over
b
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effects and by setting up the ESM.
The opportunity is now to add fur-
ther elements that will stabilise
the euro area over the long-term
and make public finances less
vulnerable to violent market reac-
tions. A euro-area budget could
incentivise and support structural
reforms in countries that respect
the commonly-defined reform tar-
gets and in which tight budget
constraints limit progress on
reforms. Second, a euro-area
budget could stabilise regionally
diverging business cycles with-
out representing a one-way
transfer mechanism. While the
completion of the single market,
in particular to increase cross-
border integration of labour and
capital markets, would dramati-
cally reduce regional business
cycle divergences, a euro-area
budget could help absorb very
large shocks such as those of the
current balance-
sheet recession.
Germany itself
would have bene-
fited from such as
system in the early
years of the euro
area when as the
‘sick man of
Europe,’ it suffered
from economic
slump and high unemployment
while having to implement struc-
tural reforms. 
A deepening of fiscal union
requires the reform of the institu-
tional set-up as a prerequisite.
The principles to be respected
when designing the institutional
framework should be to increase
the democratic legitimacy of deci-
sion-making, to minimise moral
hazard and free-riding and to
complement the assistance
approach by strengthening of
market discipline. To this end, the
euro area should be equipped
with a sovereign default mecha-
nism, which needs to be
combined with risk weights on
sovereign debt for banks. Such a
sovereign default mechanism
would be credible and would
thereby allow market discipline to
be reintroduced at an earlier stage
when problems build up. In cases
of clear insolvency, it would allow
those problems to be solved by
restructuring instead of relying on
the community to pay for the pri-
vate benefits.
Increasing the legitimacy of the
euro area and the EU is a prime
task for policymakers in the years
to come. The euro area, and with it
national decision-makers, have
lost legitimacy in two ways. Eco-
nomic performance and
employment is
weak in some mem-
ber states and
membership of the
euro area is increas-
ingly seen as a
problem, rather
than a solution.
Meanwhile, there is
a feeling that
national elections
and national decision-makers can
no longer meaningfully influence
the economic, financial and socie-
tal course a country takes. In order
to stop support for the euro area
eroding further, there is a pressing
need to increase the legitimacy of
the institutional set-up
6.
One conceivable measure would
be to strengthen the role of the
European Parliament in the eco-
nomic and fiscal governance of
the monetary union by enabling it
‘Contrary to the
current approach, the
sharing of sovereignty
should be advanced
by a strengthening of
European
institutions.’b
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to meet in a euro-area formation.
This step would, however, imply
that the current fiscal backstop,
the ESM, be reorganised. The cur-
rent logic of the ESM is that
member states contribute and
therefore national governments
and parliaments have a veto right
over all decisions. Such a unanim-
ity mechanism, however, leads to
sub-optimal outcomes from a
euro area perspective. The ESM
should evolve towards a Euro-
pean Monetary Fund with
qualified majority voting, and
which would be accountable to
the European Parliament.
Such steps, however, would
require the member states to
embark on either a Treaty change
or the creation of a new Treaty
with an outcome that from today’s
perspective would be uncertain.
First, there is a substantial danger
that a further deepening of the
euro area drives the non-mem-
bers further away from the
monetary union. This is particu-
larly true for the increasingly
EU-critical United Kingdom, which
hood of this scenario, any Treaty
negotiations and the work of an
eventual European convention
should start with a very clear
mandate, focussing essentially
on euro-area related issues. In
order to reduce the negative
impact of ratification failures, the
logic of the vote should be
changed: if a country does not rat-
ify, this should not stop the whole
process, but the country would
rule itself out of the next phase of
integration of the euro area.
Germany is set to continue to play
a central role in the development
of the euro area. The general prin-
ciple of combining support with
the relinquishing of sovereignty is
right. However, contrary to the
current approach, the sharing of
sovereignty should be advanced
by a strengthening of European
institutions, in which member
states take decisions by qualified
majority and the European Parlia-
ment by normal majority. The
intergovernmental approach pur-
sued in response to the crisis
might have been the only option
under severe pressure. It is, how-
ever, not in Germany’s long-term
interest to weaken the EU institu-
tions or to cement the lack of
EU-level democratic accountability
and legitimacy. In an intergovern-
mental system, Germany would
not only be the focal point of deci-
sion making, but also the focal
point of political resistance.
A German version of this paper
appears as SWP-Aktuell 55/2013.
moreover could use the opening
of an intergovernmental confer-
ence on Treaty change to
repatriate powers from the EU to
the national level. An important
future euro-area country such as
Poland also could be driven fur-
ther away from joining the euro
area as every substantial step of
integration pushes up the costs of
joining. Neither is in the political
or economic interest of the new
German government. In our busi-
ness survey, German business
attaches a very low probability to
a UK exit from the European Union
(Figure 3). However, should it
happen, the negative impact on
German business is expected to
be significant. So while it should
be the priority for the German gov-
ernment to deepen the euro area
by making it more resilient and
democratic, this endeavour
should be balanced with the
objective of maintaining and
deepening the single market.
A second risk is a failure of negoti-
ations or of the ratification of a
new Treaty. To minimise the likeli-
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Source: Bruegel-SWP German business survey.
Figure 3: The euro area and the UK
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